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MODERNIZATION OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS
IN ILLINOIS
LOUIS A. KOHN AND GEORGE T. BOGERT

N THE

past two decades, there has been much legislation and not a

little case law dealing with the administration of trusts in Illinois.
The reasons for the growth and use of the trust device historically
have been its flexibility and adaptability to meet changing conditions
in the rearrangement and disposition of property. It is the purpose of
this article to highlight the more significant developments in this period
with emphasis on those which indicate a trend toward relaxation or
liberalization of some of the rules governing the administration of
trusts.
In considering these developments, it is necessary to consider briefly
the social and economic background of these changes and developments. During the last two decades, the United States has gone
through a cycle of an economic depression, and then a war, on into a
period of unparalleled prosperity. The year 1940 marked the end of a
severe economic depression period in this country and the beginning
of a defense mobilization effort culminating in a period of war. The
coming of war meant higher taxes and inflation with radical consequences to trusts and their beneficiaries. While the inflationary trend
generally resulted in increased income yields from stocks, trust investments under the law at that time were for the most part confined to
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government and corporate bonds rather than common stocks. Trust
income was considerably diminished by the relatively reduced yield
from bonds and by increased expenses of trust administration. In addition, interest rates decreased markedly during this period. Together
with higher personal income taxes and increases in the cost of living,
these economic developments made it increasingly difficult for the income beneficiaries of a trust, particularly where access to trust principal was either denied or severely restricted. We are now in a period
of prosperity, and taxes, costs and expenses remain high.
In view of these great economic changes during the last twenty
years it might be well to consider their impact upon both the statutory
and case law in Illinois relating to trusts.'
With that in view a somewhat arbitrary division of the subject
matter has been made to analyze the significant developments in this
period.
TRUST INVESTMENTS

Prior to 1945, trustees in the absence of a specific delegation of authority as to particular investments were limited in the kind of investments in which trust funds could be made. The governing statute dating from 1905 could best be described as a legal list though in a permissive form.2 Where broad investment powers or full discretion was
given the trustee by the creator of the trust, the Illinois courts had
required a trustee in investing trust funds to exercise the care and
diligence of a prudent man. But where the trust instrument contained no reference to the trustee's powers of investment or restricted
him to legal investments, the restrictive effect of the legal list was
more keenly felt.3 While the trustee was not excused from liability for
losses from improper investments because of declining security prices
1 For developments in the law of trusts throughout the nation for 1942-1954, see
Annual Survey of American Law published by New York University School of Law
each year. Also see Fratcher, A Half Century of Trust Law, 93 Trusts and Estates
275 (1954). The author begins as follows: "The most striking developments in the
law of trusts of the last fifty years are the vastly increased influence of Federal law
and the growing extent to which state law has become statutory. The Federal
Revenue Acts which created the income tax in 1913, the estate tax in 1916 and the
gift tax in 1924, have had an enormous impact upon the purposes for which trusts
are created, the terms of trust instruments and the work of trust administration.
"They have, moreover, influenced changes in state law. State legislatures and
courts have recognized the undesirability of local rules which subject their citizens
to disadvantages under the Federal tax laws."

2 Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern. Trust Co., 250 Il. 86, 95 N.E. 59 (1911).
3 Ibid.
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due to the economic depression,4 occasionally judicial notice of the
depression was taken in order to relieve the trustee of liability for investment losses.' However, the trustee was not relieved of the duty to
exercise sound judgment within the requirements of the investment
statute. So, one trustee investing in so-called split mortgages under the
authority of a Probate Court order was held not liable for subsequent
depreciation even though the security held by him did not give him
an exclusive lien,6 while another trustee was surcharged for losses
resulting from this type of investment where the notes purchased were
either in default at the time of purchase or did not have prior maturities. 7 Investments in loans to the business of the testator-creator of a
trust were held improper and an abuse of the trustee's discretion
where made at a time when the business was in financial difficulties and
prior notes remained in default." An exchange by the trustee of preferred stock for common in the testator's company was held proper
where the exchange was in accord with the wishes of the testator's
widow who was a co-trustee, judicial notice having been taken that
real estate mortgages at that time were not the best investment.' Where
authorized by the terms of the trust to retain bank stock purchased by
the testator, a trustee was held not to be liable for losses resulting from
what the court called an honest mistake in judgment by its predecessor
in the retention of the stock in a declining market.' 0
However the above cases would be decided today under the
Prudent Investor Statute now in force in Illinois, certain kinds of investments were believed to be forbidden unless specifically authorized.
These included common stocks" and investments in common trust
funds. Common stocks were usually considered speculative and imprudent investments, while investments in common trust funds vio4

In re Estate of Busby, 288 Il. App. 500, 6 N.E. 2d 451 (1937).

5 Conant v. Lansden, 409 Ill. 149, 98 N.E. 2d 773 (1951); Hatfield v. First National
Bank of Danville, 317 Ill. App. 169, 46 N.E. 2d 94 (1942); Pank v. Chicago Title &
Trust, 314 Ill. App. 53, 40 N.E. 2d 787 (1942).
6 In re Lalla, 362 111. 621, 1 N.E. 2d 50 (1936).
7

Merchants National Bank v. Frazier, 329 Ill. App. 191, 67 N.E. 2d 611 (1943).

8 Conant v. Lansden, 409 Ill. 149, 98 N.E. 2d 773 (1951); Nonnast v. Northern
Trust Co., 374 Ill. 248, 29 N.E. 2d 251 (1940); Humpa v. Hedstrom, 345 Ill. App. 289,
102 N.E. 2d 686 (1951).
9

Pank v. Chicago Title & Trust, 314 Ill. App. 53, 40 N.E. 2d 787 (1942).

10 Hatfield v. First National Bank of Danville, 317 Ill. App. 169, 46 N.E. 2d 92
(1942).
11White v. Sherman, 168 111.589, 48 N.E. 128 (1897); People v. Canton National
Bank, 288 Ill. App. 418, 6 N.E. 2d 220 (1937).
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lated traditional principles requiring the segregation or earmarking of
the trust fund.
In 1945, the Prudent Man Rule was adopted in Illinois. 1 2 It extended
the field of investments available to a trustee by recognizing corporate
obligations including preferred or common stocks as proper investments. Under the new law trustees are authorized to retain any part of
the trust estate received by them even though it may not be of a class
suitable for original purchase.' 8 It requires that a trustee not limited
to legal or specified investments by the terms of the trust need exercise
the judgment and care of men of prudence in the management of their
own affairs in exercising its discretion in making investments.' 4 In
giving a trustee who has discretionary powers of investment a wider
choice of possible investments, the statute has permitted trustees to
adapt and adjust investments to meet changing economic conditions,
for example, to purchase common stocks as a hedge against inflation.
In 1943, the Common Trust Fund Act was adopted.' Prior to its
enactment, the problem of finding good investments for trusts of
smaller size had grown increasingly difficult for corporate fiduciaries.
Authorized investments were in great demand as the volume of trusts
being administered continued to grow and the larger trusts were
better able to compete for these investments. The new act permitted
any corporate fiduciary to establish and invest in common trust funds
where the trust fund held for investment could properly be invested
in the investments to become a part of the common trust fund. In
1953, common trust certificates were classified as securities exempt
from the registration requirements of the Illinois Securities Law.'
To facilitate the sale of securities and other property in situations
where speed in consummation of the sale is important, a trustee has
had the power since 1951 to cause the stocks or the property to be
registered and held in the name of a nominee without mention of the
7
trust in the instrument of title.'
12111. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 148, § 32. For a detailed discussion of the statute and
the state of the prior law, see the excellent article by Dillon, The Illinois Prudent
Man Investment Statute, 24 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 103 (1946).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 148, S 32.
14 In Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Price, 11 N.J. 90, 93 A. 2d 321 (1952), the New
Jersey statute was held constitutional although applied retroactively to a pre-existing
trust.

15 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 16 Y2,S§ 57-63 as amended S.H.A. (Supp., 1955) c. 16 A,
S60.
16111. Rev. Star. (1953)

c. 16 2 , §§ 59-63.

17 1!1. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 148, S 36.
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TRUST ACCOUNTING

In 1941, a modified form of the Uniform Principal and Income Act
was adopted in Illinois.18 While its provisions in many cases represent
the common law previously established by judicial decision in Illinois,
its purpose was to set forth rules to guide trustees in determining some
of the difficult questions with respect to income and principal and the
apportionment and allocation of receipts and disbursements between
income and principal. Although applicable only where the creation of
the trust fails either to specify the trustee's duties in these matters or
to leave it to the trustee's discretion, the rules do tend by their authority to establish uniformity in accounting practices and in the administration of trusts, and to maintain impartial and equitable treatment between the interests of the life tenant and that of the remainderman. As
a result of the codification of these rules, trust administration has become, if not easier for the trustee and less expensive for the trust and
its beneficiaries, perhaps fairer to the beneficiaries. The act was
amended to provide that after the effective date of an amendment,
premium on bonds purchased by trustees need not be amortized out
of income but may be charged to principal. 19
TRUSTEE'S POWERS

In addition to the increased powers of investment given trustees by
statute, there have been both legislative, drafting and case law trends
toward enlargement of the express and (as to case law) implied
powers of trustees in the administration of trusts. In 1935, it was provided by statute that a majority of all trustees may act in all cases
where two or more trustees are required to execute a trust, provided
written notice has been given to each trustee at least 5 days in advance
of the contemplated action.20 By statute in 1947 trustees were given
the power to grant options, to contract to sell, to sell at public auction
or private sale and to convert any or all trust property, real or personal, in such manner and upon terms and conditions as deemed best
for the trust.2 1 A trustee has the further power under the 1947 amend18 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953)

c. 30, §§ 159-176, discussed at length by Bogert, The Illinois

Principal and Income Act of 1941, 9 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 30 (1941), also commented
on in 21 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 454 (1954).
19 ll1. Rev.
20 Ill. Rev.
111. App. 275,
21 I11.Rev.

Stat. (1953) c.
Stat. (1953) c.
83 N.E. 2d 362
Stat. (1953) c.

30, 165(4).
148, 33; see Atwood v. Commercial National Bank, 336
(1949).
148, § 35.
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ment to execute proxies to vote corporate stock. Other provisions of
this amendment give the remaining trustee during the period of a
vacancy in the trusteeship all rights and powers, discretionary or
otherwise, of all the trustees and give successor trustees the rights and
powers, discretionary or otherwise, of the original trustee. Reference
has been made to the power of a trustee to hold trust property in the
name of a nominee without mention of the trust in the record or evidence of title to the property.22
Even without express statutory sanction the Illinois courts have, by
fair implication, in many instances encouraged the proliferation and
development of the powers of a trustee. The trustee's power of sale
given him in the trust instrument has been held to include the power
to sell trust realty not for cash alone, but in exchange for stock and
bonds of the purchasing corporation.2 3 A trustee with the broad powers to improve, develop, lease, sell, or otherwise dispose of property to
the end that a cemetery might be established had the power to engage
in the business of buying and selling monuments and markers. 24 Where
the will did not direct the trustee to sell realty immediately, the trustee
had the power to enter into an oil lease rather than sell at a sacrifice. 5
A power of sale in a trustee during the term of the trust continues for
a reasonable period of time necessary to wind up the trust.26 A trustee
selling property may give one bidder the right to meet other bids
made within a limited period even if other bidders did not acquire
such a right. 7 These cases indicate a willingness on the part of the
courts to construe the trustee's power to sell, whether by direction or
statutory authorization, as broadly as the trust purposes warrant.
This "liberal" construction applies to other powers, such as the
power to carry on the testator's business,2 8 to contract with third per22

Ibid., S 36.

23 Sarasin v. Live Stock National Bank of Chicago, 412 Ii. 88, 105 N.E. 2d 752
(1952); Plast v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 401 Ill. 302, 82 N.E. 2d 155 (1948).
24 Decatur Monument Co. v. New Graceland Cemetery Association, 342 Ill. App.

692, 97 N.E. 2d 570 (1951).
25
Heyl v. Northern Trust Co., 312 IIl. App. 207, 38 N.E. 2d 374 (1941).
26 Breen v. Breen, 411 111. 206, 103 N.E. 2d 625 (1952); see note, Trust Administration upon Termination, 32 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 307 (1954).
27
Koenig v. Bickel, 338 I11.App. 21, 86 N.E. 2d 827 (1949).
28 Conant v. Lansden, 341 111. App. 488, 94 N.E. 2d 594 (1950), aff'd on this point
in 409 Ill. 149, 98 N.E. 2d 251. Cf. Nonnast v. Northern Trust Co., 374 I1. 248, 29
N.E. 2d 251 (1940), where no express authority was shown to permit the trustee to
carry on a corporate business in which the testator had been the principal officer.
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sons, 29 and the implied power to employ a real estate broker.30 The
provisions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act 3 ' as to requirements
for the transfer of title to stock were held not to be applicable in a
case involving a suit against the settlor by the trustee. 32 There have
been several interesting cases applying the provisions of Section 2 of
the Fiduciary Obligations Act33 intended to protect third parties making payments to trustees. 34 The courts have required more than negligence on the part of the person paying money to a fiduciary to hold
such person liable for the resulting loss; proof of knowledge or facts
showing bad faith are necessary. 5
DEVIATION AND INVASION OF CORPUS

The rapid and complex changes in our economic life and the resulting increase in the types of property available for trust investment
either have required legislation, as in the areas of trust investment and
accounting, or have called for an adaptation and flexible interpretation
of traditional powers as expressed in (or implied from) the customary
language in trust instruments. Where changed circumstances have met
head-on with well-established rules of construction or with express
provisions of the trust instrument, the resulting dilemma often could
not be solved by legislative means or by liberal construction of the
language used by the creator of the trust. It then becomes a question
of whether a court of equity supervising the administration of the
trust will act to grant relief in the face of the express terms or well
established rules.
While the general principles to guide the court in its discretion are
well known, such considerations as the intent of the settlor, the hardship involved and the effect upon other beneficiaries help determine
the court's decision whether to exercise its discretion and permit deviation from the terms of the trust instrument. Involved here are situations where the trust terms permit no liberal construction nor implication of powers to the trustees, as in the cases referred to previously in
29 Barrett v. Hennebry, 322 111.App. 703, 54 N.E. 2d 647 (1944)
30Newby v. Kingman, 309

(abstract opinion).

111. App. 36, 32 N.E. 2d 647 (1941).

1111. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 32, §§ 416-439.
Home for Destitute Crippled Children v. Boomer, 308 Ill. App. 170, 31 N.E. 2d

32

812 (1941).
33 I11. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 98, § 235.
34 See, for example, Callahan v. Holsman, 351 111.App. 1, 113 N.E. 2d 483 (1953).
35 Ibid.
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consideration of the trustee's powers. The guiding principles as well
as the cases have been well summarized elsewhere.3 A corollary question is as to the circumstances under which a court will authorize invasion of principal for the benefit of income or remaindermen beneficiaries.
Again, changing economic and even political conditions have left
their mark. A residence in a once prosperous residential neighborhood
may lose its value because of the movement to the suburbs or the influx
of industry. Income from investments specified by the testator may be
inadequate to accomplish the testator's objective of care and support
of his family or other income beneficiaries. For these and many other
reasons3 7 deviation from the express terms of the trust may be sought.
It should be noted that under the Prudent Investor Statute of 1945,
the court is granted the power to authorize a deviation from the investment provisions of the trust. As has been pointed out in the article
by Wentworth38 the courts in this country have been more ready to
permit deviations from the administrative provisions of trusts, such as
powers of sale, investment and general administrative matters, than
from substantive or distributive provisions affecting the rights of trust
beneficiaries.
Two cases involving somewhat similar considerations were decided
differently by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the last decade. In the
case of Stough v. Brach decided in 194730 a trust of a residence for the
benefit of the settlor's wife was created upon their separation. The
trust provided that the property should not be sold for less than a fixed
price without the consent of the settlor. Later the wife sought a decree
for the sale of the residence without her husband's consent on the
grounds that sale was necessary to prevent destruction of the trust
res, that the market value had greatly decreased and that rental income
would not pay for taxes and repairs. The court held that there had
been no showing of an emergency so as to justify a sale contrary to
the terms of the trust, as for example, the court said, a showing that the
property would be lost even if the wife had complied with her obligation to pay taxes and for repairs.
86 Wentworth, Deviation from Terms of Will, 92 Trusts & Estates 720 (1953); 35
ill. Bar J. 417 (1947).
87 See the discussion of reasons including "unanticipated changes" in Wentworth,
Deviation from Terms of Will, 92 Trusts & Estates 720, 721 (1953).
88 Ibid.
39 395 Ill. 544, 70 N.E. 2d 585 (1947).
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In the case of Dyer v. Paddock,40 a trust of residential property had
been created in 1906 with the direction to retain the property until the
death of the testator's wife and death or marriage of all his daughters
and then to divide the estate among his daughters or their issue. On
proof that the neighborhood had changed from a residential to a commercial one and the residence had thereby become deteriorated and
obsolete the court directed a sale to a commercial buyer. The decision
appeared to be based both upon the inherent power of a court of
equity to act in such a situation 4' and upon the power of a court of
42
equity to authorize a sale under section 50 of the Chancery Act.

Where increased amounts of income or principal are sought by trust
beneficiaries the Illinois courts have remained unwilling to permit deviation from the trust provisions except upon the showing of emergency or extreme hardship circumstances usually involving a danger
to the purpose of the trust and the intent of the settlor4
REVOCABLE AND SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS

In two other important fields there have been significant developments in the case law of Illinois.
The validity of revocable trusts reserving substantial rights to the
settlor has been upheld through the years in Illinois." A case decided
in 1944 by the Appellate Court caused some new thinking about the
universal validity of this type of trust. In the case of Smith v. Northern Trust Co. 45 the settlor transferred virtually his entire estate in

trust with income to be paid to himself for life reserving the power
of revocation, the right to request principal from the trustee and a
veto power over investments. Following the death of the settlor, the
trust was held to be illusory and fraudulent as to the settlor's widow
with respect to her statutory rights to her husband's estate. Recent discussion of revocable trusts has centered about the rights of the wife
and creditors of the settlor to set aside the trust or to secure payment
40 395 Ill. 288, 70 N.E. 2d 49 (1946).
41 Board of Education v. City of Rockford, 372 Ill. 442, 24 N.E. 2d 366 (1939).

42 111. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 22, § 50; see also Clarke v. Chicago Title and Trust Co.,
393 Ill. 419, 66 N.E. 2d 379 (1946).
43 For an interesting case in which invasion of corpus was denied, see Tree v.
Rives, 347 Il. App. 358, 106 N.E. 2d 870 (1952).
44 Gurnett v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934); Bear v.
Milliken Trust Co., 336 111. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929); Kelly v. Parker, 181 In. 49, 54 N.E.

615 (1899).
45 322 In. App. 168, 54 N.E. 2d 75 (1944).
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of debts from the trust income or principal. 46 How far can a settlor go
in retaining income, power of revocation, and powers of control as
well as powers of administration normally exercised by the trustee?
The recent case of Farkas v. Williams47 is significant in answering
this question. There the settlor had stock in an investment corporation
issued to himself as trustee for another. There were detailed provisions
in the stock certificate reserving to the trustee during his lifetime all
dividends, the powers to vote the stock, revoke and amend the trust
and change the beneficiaries, among other things. The trust was held
valid and not illusory on the grounds that the beneficiary had acquired
an immediate interest and that the retention of substantial control did
not make the trust an invalid testamentary disposition.
Spendthrift trusts have been accepted as valid in Illinois. The questions arising in the past two decades in Illinois have concerned the
rights of creditors of a beneficiary of a spendthrift trust to reach income payable to such beneficiary. Here again, social policy considerations require a balancing of the wishes of the settlor against the legitimate demands of creditors. To what extent will the settlor's scheme
for the administration of the trust income be violated? Is there a trend
away from strict enforcement of spendthrift clauses in trusts toward
more liberal treatment of creditors? Section 49 of the Chancery Act
provides for a creditor's bill in equity to reach the interest of a trust
beneficiary where execution on a judgment at law has been returned
unsatisfied.48 It has been held that the income from a spendthrift trust
could be reached in a suit to enforce payment of alimony. 49 However,
in 1943, the Supreme Court decided that garnishment could not be
maintained against the trustees by the creditors of a trust beneficiary
of a non-spendthrift testamentary trust under section 49 of the Chancery Act where the trust is created by someone other than the beneficiary. 0 The court in part relied on the federal court's decision in

Baumgardenv. Reconstruction FinanceCorporation5' which had held
46 See, for example, Hayes, Illinois Dower and the "Illusory" Trust, 2 De Paul L.
Rev. 1 (1952); 43 111.Bar J. (1954).
475 111.2d 417, 125 N.E. 2d 600 (1955) reversing 3 111.App. 2d 248, 121 N.E. 2d
344 (1954), noted infra page 153.
48111. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 22, §49.
49 Keller v. Keller, 284 111.App. 198, 1 N.E. 2d 773 (1936).
50 Dunham v. Kaufman, 385 111.79, 52 N.E. 2d 143 (1944); accord: Baumgarden v.
American National Bank and Trust Co., 322 111.App. 135, 54 N.E. 2d 86 (1944).
51 131 F. 2d 741 (C.A. 7th, 1942).
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that income payable to a beneficiary could not be reached by garnishment on a judgment against a beneficiary even though there was no
spendthrift provision in the trust instrument. Both the Dunham and
Baumgardencases have been severely criticized as socially undesirable
52
and wrongly decided under prior case law and the statute.
Other cases indicate how carefully the Dunham rule is applied. The
prohibition does not apply to a trust created by the beneficiary for
himself or to income from property held in trust for a beneficiary who
had purchased his interest, 53 nor does it prevent a trustee-executor
from setting off a claim arising out of a debt owing the settlor by the
beneficiary against the interest of the beneficiary.5 4 Furthermore,
where the interest of the debtor-beneficiary is voluntarily alienable
the trustee in bankruptcy for his estate is entitled to it as an asset of his
estate under section 70 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act.5 5
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

There have been other significant developments in the past twenty
years. The law as to the right of foreign trust companies to act in
Illinois was clarified in 1953 and corporate trustees from other states
are now allowed to act here if Illinois corporations are given the same
privilege in the other states.56 The accumulations statute has been
revised to permit accumulations for the period of the common law
rule against perpetuities. 57 The recently enacted "pour-over" statute
enables a testator to dispose of his property under his will in accordance with the provisions of an inter vivos trust.5 Pension and profit
sharing trusts were exempted from the restrictions of the rule against
accumulations59 and from those of the common law rule against perpe52 Porter, Statutory Spendthrift Trusts, 79 Trusts & Estates 173 (1944); 38 111.L.
Rev. 335, 408 (1944).
53Balaban v. Willett, 305 Il1. App. 388, 27 N.E. 2d 612 (1940).
54 McKeown v. Pridmore, 310 Ill. App. 634, 35 N.E. 2d 376 (1941).

55 Young v. Handwork, 179 F. 2d 70 (C.A. 7th, 1950); cf. Hummel v. Cardwell,
390 Ill. 526, 62 N.E. 2d 433 (1945), where the trustee in bankruptcy was held not
entitled to a bill of review to question the sale of his debtor's beneficial interest. See
comment, Availability of Trust Interests to Beneficiary's Creditors or Trustee in
Bankruptcy, 41 Ill. L. Rev. 214 (1946).

56111. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 32, S 304.1-5.
571. Rev. Stat. (1953)

c. 30, S 153.
S.H.A. (Supp., 1955) c. 3, § 194a. See article by Fleming, The New Pour-Over
Bill, 43 111. Bar J. 906 (1955).
59 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 30, § 153.
58
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tuities. 6° During the war legislation was enacted empowering certain
courts to appoint temporary trustees to preserve the property of persons in military service. 6 ' While the courts generally adhered to the
rule requiring a trustee to give his undivided loyalty to the trust 62 an
apparent relaxation of the rule was sanctioned in allowing trust mana-63
gers to personally acquire beneficial interests in the trust property.
In the field of charitable trusts, several interesting cases were noted
making liberal application of the Cy Pres doctrine.64 However it is in
the regulatory aspects and supervision of charitable trusts that important developments can be expected in the next few years. The tax
exempt status of vast private foundations and other charitable organizations and the wide publicity given instances of abuses have focused
widespread attention on this entire subject and it will no doubt receive
greater public scrutiny in the future.65 The growing recognition of
the need for stricter state supervision and enforcement and greater
accountability has resulted in agitation for appropriate legislation. In
several states legislation has already been adopted enlarging the powers
of the Attorney General and requiring the filing of reports66 and the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1954 promulgated the proposed "Uniform Supervision of Charitable Trust Act" with the same
ends in view. 7 This Uniform Act was introduced in the Illinois legis60 111. Rev. Stat.

(1953) c. 48, § 39t.
(1953) c. 148, S41-47.
Rev.
Stat.
1 Ill.

62Taussig v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 171 F. 2d 553 (C.A. 7th, 1949); Stone v.
Baldwin, 414 Ill. 257, 111 N.E. 2d 97 (1953); Glasser v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 414
I. 180, 111 N.E. 2d 124 (1953); Holyoke v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.,
346 Ill. App. 284, 104 N.E. 2d 838 (1952) (trustee-creditor cannot allocate trust
property to itself in payment); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank v. Kelley, 333 Ill. App. 119,
76 N.E. 2d 820 (1948).
03 Victor v. Hillebrecht, 405 IlI. 264, 90 N.E. 2d 751 (1950).
64 First National Bank of Chicago v. Elliott, 406 Ill. 44, 92 N.E. 2d 66 (1950); Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Sever, 393 11. 81, 65 N.E. 2d 385 (1946); First
National Bank of Chicago v. King Edward's Hospital Fund, 1 111. App. 2d 338, 117
N.E. 2d 656 (1954) (testamentary gift to English hospitals upheld although hospitals
had been nationalized).
65 See Taylor, Public Accountability of Foundations and Charitable Trusts (1953)
published by the Russell Sage Foundation, reviewed by Curran, 3 De Paul L. Rev.
304 (1954); Bogert, The Community Trust: A Service Opportunity for Lawyers,
41 A.B.A.J. 587 (1955).
66 Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island and South Carolina.
67

For discussion of this act, see Bogert, Proposed Legislation Regarding State Super-

vision of Charities, 52 Mich. L. Rev. 633 (1954).
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lature in 1955.68 While it failed of passage it led to the establishment of
a Charitable Trust Laws Commission made up of ten members of the
General Assembly "to make a thorough study to determine whether
a need exists for legislation in relation to the supervision and enforcement of public charitable trusts."6 The commission is requested to
make its report and submit drafts of proposed legislation by March 15,
1957 and is empowered to conduct hearings and subpoena witnesses
and to compel production of documents.
This legislation is further evidence of the deep public interest in the
honest and efficient administration of the huge sums held in charitable
trusts and the growing realization that the community is entitled to
some degree of accountability from these privileged organizations.
It is hoped that the Commission in making its recommendations will
keep before it the following objectives:
In return for such solid advantages, and also in view of the fact that the ultimate beneficiary is society itself, however particularly the gift may be directed,
it seems wholly proper that the foundation or trust should be held accountable
for its stewardship. The availability of the new social asset should be made known

promptly, at least to public authorities and possibly widely. Society should have
the means of protecting itself against theft, squandering, or unreasonable with-

holding of this promised benefit. Finally, the operations of the exempt organization should be fully and regularly reported, with adequate provision
for re70
view by a public authority possessing power to correct abuses.

By adhering to such a standard, a monumental step will have been
taken in Illinois to utilize the trust device in one of its most important
functions today for the maximum public benefit, and will be another
landmark in the definite trend that we have seen towards modernization and improved administration in the law of trusts in this state.
68The Uniform Act was adopted in California in 1955 with some changes such
as adding a provision for exempting banks and trust companies as well as hospitals

and religious and educational institutions provided for in the Uniform Act.
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